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Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et al. v. Animalfeeds International Corp. 
Docket No. 08-1198
Argument Date: December 9, 2009
From: The Second Circuit
by Jay E. Grenig
Marquette university Law School
CASE AT A GLANCE 
In this case, an arbitration panel held the maritime contracts at issue permitted class arbitration. The 
respondents had successfully argued that, because the arbitration clauses were silent on the question, 
arbitration on behalf of a class could proceed. The petitioners, however, contend that because the 
arbitration clauses were silent, the parties did not intend to permit class arbitration. The Supreme Court has 
now agreed to review the Second Circuit’s ruling upholding the arbitrators’ decision.
A R B I T R AT I O N
Can Arbitrators Order Class Arbitration if the Arbitration Clause  
in a Maritime Agreement Is Silent on the Issue? 
ISSUE
When the arbitration clause in a maritime agreement is silent with 
respect to class arbitration, may the arbitrator require the matter be 
submitted to class arbitration?
FACTS
The petitioners (collectively Stolt-Nielsen) are predominantly foreign 
corporations operating parcel tankers that carry bulk chemical and 
other specialty liquids in individual tanks that can be separately 
chartered. The respondent Animalfeeds International Corp. is a multi-
national corporation that sells and ships animal feed internationally. 
Stolt-Nielsen and Animalfeeds entered into several shipping contracts 
providing for oceanic transportation of Animalfeeds’ cargo. The 
contracts contained arbitration clauses but were silent with respect to 
class arbitration.
Animalfeeds claims Stolt-Nielsen is engaged in a global conspiracy to 
restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker shipping 
services in violation of federal antitrust laws. Animalfeeds seeks to 
proceed in court on behalf of a class of all direct purchasers of parcel 
tanker transportation services. It filed suit in the u.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2003. After the action was 
transferred to the District of Connecticut, Stolt-Nielsen moved to 
compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion. The Second 
Circuit reversed, holding the parties’ transactions were governed by 
contracts with enforceable agreements to arbitrate.  JLM Indus., Inc. 
v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 183 (2d Cir. 2004).
The parties then agreed the arbitrators “shall follow and be bound by 
Rules 3 through 7 of the American Arbitration Association’s Supple-
mentary Rules for Class Arbitrations (as effective Oct. 8, 2003).” Rule 
3 of the Supplementary Rules provides:
upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a thresh-
old matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construc-
tion of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitra-
tion clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or 
against a class (the “Clause Construction Award”). 
The arbitration panel received evidence on the question of whether 
the contracts permitted or precluded class arbitration. Animalfeeds 
argued that, because the arbitration clauses were silent, arbitration 
on behalf of a class could proceed. Stolt-Nielsen’s position was that, 
because the arbitration clauses were silent, the parties did not intend 
to permit class arbitration. 
On December 20, 2005, the arbitration panel issued a Clause 
Construction Award deciding that the agreements permitted class 
arbitration. The panel based its decision largely on the fact that, in all 
21 published clause construction awards issued under Rule 3 of the 
Supplementary Rules, the arbitrators had interpreted silent arbitra-
tion clauses to permit class arbitration. The panel did not certify a 
class or decide whether the arbitration should proceed as a class 
action. 
Stolt-Nielsen petitioned the district court to vacate (set aside) the 
Clause Construction Award. The court granted the petition, con-
cluding the award had been made in manifest disregard of the law. 
According to the district court, the arbitrators had “failed to make any 
meaningful choice-of-law analysis.” Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds 
Int’l Corp., 435 F.Supp.2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
On appeal, the u.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed 
the district court. The Second Circuit held the arbitration panel had 
not manifestly disregarded the law by failing to engage in a choice-
of-law analysis and by expressly identifying federal maritime law as 
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governing the interpretation of charter party language. 548 F.3d 85 
(2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit explained the “manifest disregard” 
doctrine allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration award 
only in those exceedingly rare instances in which some egregious 
impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent. The court stated 
that only if an arbitrator’s decision strains credulity or does not rise to 
the standard of “barely colorable” may a court conclude the arbitrator 
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it. The Second 
Circuit returned the case to the district court with instructions to 
deny the petition to vacate the arbitration panel’s decision. The u.S. 
Supreme Court granted review of the Second Circuit’s decision. 129 
S.Ct. 2793 (2009).
CASE ANALYSIS
The central purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 u.S.C. § 1 et 
seq.) is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced 
according to their terms. The Federal Arbitration Act does not 
mandate arbitration under any particular set of procedures; instead, 
the act leaves it to the parties to decide the nature and scope of their 
arbitration and the rules under which it will be conducted. Arbitrators 
derive their power only from the parties’ agreement. In this case, the 
parties stipulated that their arbitration agreements were silent on the 
question of class arbitration. They differ on the legal implications of 
that silence.
By adopting Animalfeeds’s position that class arbitration should be 
imposed as a matter of public policy even in the absence of any agree-
ment by the parties allowing it, Stolt-Nielsen argues, the arbitration 
panel did not base its clause construction award on the actual intent 
of the parties, but rather on what it selected as a background rule 
of law to govern in the absence of party agreement. According to 
Stolt-Nielsen, imposing class arbitration where the parties have not 
explicitly agreed to it cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s 
mandate that arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act is a matter 
of consent, not coercion. Stolt-Nielsen says that unexpected and invol-
untary class arbitration fundamentally alters the risks and benefits of 
the original arbitral bargain. 
The petitioners also claim that imposing class arbitration transforms 
inherently limited commercial disputes into sprawling, high-stakes 
matters that the parties never agreed to resolve without the safe-
guards afforded by actual litigation. Stolt-Nielsen says that imposing 
class arbitration substantially alters many of the expected benefits of 
arbitration, such as flexibility, expedition, confidentiality, the parties’ 
right to select different arbitrators to resolve particular disputes, 
and the promise of reliable, mutual repose once a dispute has been 
resolved.
It is the position of Stolt-Nielsen that uncertainty as to enforce-
ment and finality is particularly acute in the context of international 
arbitration, because many countries do not allow class proceedings 
and may refuse to recognize the binding effect of class awards. Stolt-
Nielsen asserts that imposing class arbitration in an international 
maritime case would be at odds with established practice in the rest 
of the world. It argues the point is not that class arbitration is neces-
sarily unworkable in all circumstances, but that it is so different from 
traditional, bilateral arbitration that it may not properly be imposed 
under the guise of enforcing a conventional arbitration agreement 
that is silent on the issue.
Stolt-Nielsen contends this case presents no occasion for departing 
from the Federal Arbitration Act’s central mandate that arbitration 
agreements be enforced only in accordance with their terms. First, 
it says the Supreme Court has made clear that efficiency or similar 
policy considerations provide no basis for going beyond the agree-
ment of the parties. Second, the petitioners claim class proceedings 
(in arbitration or litigation) are not necessary to vindicate Animal-
feeds’ rights under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Finally, Stolt-Nielsen stresses this case presents none of the issues 
that might arise in the context of consumer contracts of adhesion. 
It explains that all contracts are construed based on their own terms 
and context, and some consumer contracts may be properly construed, 
using conventional intent-based tools, to contemplate class arbitra-
tion—for example, by construing an ambiguous contract against a 
more sophisticated or economically dominant drafter. Alternatively, if 
true contractual silence results in the unavailability of class arbitra-
tion, Stolt-Nielsen says traditional principles such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability could lead a court to void an arbitration provision 
entirely under Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Stolt-Nielsen asserts the parties in this case are sophisticated multi-
national corporations who negotiated international commercial ship-
ping charters using industry forms typically designed and selected by 
charterers or their brokers (not by shipping companies). The finished 
forms reflect individual negotiations between the parties and have 
been in use for decades without any history of class arbitration. un-
der these circumstances, Stolt-Nielsen declares that arbitrators may 
not impose class arbitration on the basis of a contract that all agree 
reflects no agreement to permit it.
Claiming the Federal Arbitration Act forbids forcing parties into a 
class arbitration to which they never consented, Stolt-Nielsen argues 
that arbitrators who permit class arbitration without party consent 
have exceeded the powers conferred on them by the parties’ agree-
ment, and therefore federal courts must vacate their award. 
Animalfeeds responds that what is at issue here is the preliminary 
decision of a unanimous panel of three experienced arbitrators who 
held that the parties’ broad arbitration clause—requiring arbitration 
of “any dispute arising from the making, performance or termination 
of the contract”—permits the civil cases for restitution to be arbi-
trated on a class-wide basis. Animalfeeds explains that the parties’ 
Supplemental Agreement assigned the task of construing the arbitra-
tion clause to the arbitrators.
According to Animalfeeds, parties agreeing to arbitrate trade away 
much of the value of ordinary judicial review. Instead, they agree to 
accept very minimal review of any matter delegated to the arbitra-
tors. Thus, matters committed to arbitrators are subject to being set 
aside only on narrowly circumscribed statutory grounds on appeal—
ordinary legal error does not suffice. Animalfeeds then argues the 
arbitrators did not exceed their powers in this case because they 
decided precisely what the parties had asked them to decide: whether 
the contract permits class arbitration.
According to Animalfeeds, class proceedings are not incompatible 
with arbitration. The respondent says hundreds of class proceedings 
have been successfully administered by major institutional arbitra-
tion service providers, including the American Arbitration  
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Association. The association administers these proceedings pursu-
ant to the specialized sets of class arbitration rules they developed in 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Green Tree Financial Corp. 
v. Bazzle, 539 u.S. 444 (2003). 
Animalfeeds asserts that, under the Supreme Court’s decisions, state 
contract law governs interpretation of an arbitration clause, even 
when federal law creates the substantive claim. Animalfeeds explains 
the arbitrators permissibly held that, under traditional contract 
rules, a clause broadly providing for the arbitration of “any disputes” 
authorizes class arbitration, even though the clause itself was silent 
on the issue.
The respondents claim Stolt-Nielsen is seeking to have the arbitra-
tors’ ruling set aside, based on a proposed new Federal Arbitration 
Act–based rule barring class arbitration unless the contract specifi-
cally mentions class proceedings with approval. Animalfeeds says the 
Supreme Court has never read the Federal Arbitration Act as imposing 
any such limitation, and it should not do so now. Instead, Animalfeeds 
argues the statutory reference to interpretation of contracts “in accor-
dance with their terms” requires resort to ordinary principles of state 
contract law, which it says is precisely what the arbitrators did here.
According to Animalfeeds, there is no justification for the Supreme 
Court to create a new federal maritime version of the petitioners’ 
proposed rule. It reasons that the interests Stolt-Nielsen identifies 
with maritime arbitration are not specific to it, but broadly apply to 
arbitration in most international and domestic settings, and thus war-
rant no special rule. Animalfeeds argues that in agreeing to a broad 
arbitration clause without incorporating any specific procedural rules, 
Stolt-Nielsen took the risk that the arbitrators might apply rules it did 
not like.
Animalfeeds argues the established rule of contract interpretation 
requiring that contracts be read so as to serve the public interest 
adds support to the arbitrators’ decision. It says that foreclosing class 
arbitration under broad arbitration clauses would lead either to the 
inefficiencies and unfairness of multiple, separate arbitrations on 
common issues, or, more realistically, make it untenable for would-be 
class members to proceed individually. Animalfeeds claims the enor-
mous costs of duplicating the complex proof of antitrust injury in indi-
vidual arbitrations would discourage most claimants from proceeding, 
resulting in dramatic under-enforcement of the Sherman Act.
Finally, Animalfeeds asserts the petition to vacate the arbitrators’ 
decision is not ripe. Pointing out that the arbitrators have issued only 
an interim interpretation and have not decided whether to certify 
any class, Animalfeeds says that allowing review of the arbitrators’ 
interim decision at this preliminary stage would turn on its head the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s purpose of providing streamlined and simpli-
fied proceedings.
SIGNIFICANCE
Because the parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to sub-
mit their dispute to arbitration to enhance efficiency, reduce costs, or 
maintain control over who would settle their disputes, the vacating of 
an arbitral award is unusual. According to the Supreme Court, the ju-
dicial review provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act should be seen 
as the substance of a national policy favoring arbitration with just 
the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue 
of resolving disputes straightaway. Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008). In Hall Street, the Supreme Court rejected 
the attempt of parties to an arbitration agreement to contract for 
expanded judicial review of arbitration awards. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the grounds for vacating an arbitration award set forth 
in the Federal Arbitration are exclusive.
The Court did not resolve the question of whether, under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, a court may vacate an arbitration award for manifest 
disregard of the law. Since Hall Street, courts have addressed the 
question of whether the manifest disregard doctrine survived Hall 
Street. Some have concluded that the doctrine did not, while others 
have suggested that manifest disregard is a judicial gloss on the 
specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in Section 10 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.
A class arbitration is an arbitration proceeding brought by one or 
more claimants on behalf of many others who have a common legal 
claim. Class arbitrations have become more common in the last 
twenty years, and in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 u.S. 
444 (2003), the Supreme Court addressed the relationship between 
class actions and arbitration for the first time. Bazzle held that, when 
an arbitration clause in question does not clearly preclude class 
arbitration, the issue is one of state-law contract interpretation to be 
resolved by the arbitrator. Following Bazzle, four circuits have held it 
is for the arbitrator to determine whether a contract authorizes class 
arbitration, and two more have relied on Bazzle to assign to arbitra-
tors similar issues, such as whether a clause permits consolidation.
This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify 
whether Hall Street precludes vacating an arbitration award on the 
ground of manifest disregard of the law. It also presents an op-
portunity to address a question not addressed in Bazzle—whether 
the Federal Arbitration Act prohibits class-action procedures from 
being imposed when the agreement does not provide for class-action 
arbitration.
It will be interesting to see whether the Supreme Court limits its 
decision to maritime arbitration agreements such as those at issue 
in this case, or whether it addresses the broader issues of manifest 
disregard of the law and whether the Federal Arbitration Act prohibits 
class-action procedures in all arbitrations under the Act—including 
consumer arbitration. 
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law at Marquette university Law School 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Prof. Grenig is the author of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution, published by ThomsonReuters/West, and a 
member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. He can be reached at 
jgrenig@earthlink.net or 414.288.5377.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 133–136.  
© 2009 American Bar Association.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases136
ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES
For Petitioners Stolt-Nielsen et al.	(Seth	P.	Waxman,	202.663.6000)
For Respondent Animalfeeds International Corp.	(Nina	T.	L.	Pillard,	
202.662.9391)
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioners Stolt-Nielsen, et al. 
Association	of	Ship	Brokers	and	Agents	et	al.	(William	J.	Honan,	
212.513.3200)
Chamber	of	Commerce	of	the	United	States	of	America,	
202.736.8000)
CTIA	(Evan	M.	Tager,	202.263.3000)
DRI	(Jerrold	J.	Ganzfried,	202.783.0800)
Equal	Employment	Advisory	Council	(Rae	T.	Vann,	202.629.5600)
Pacific	Legal	Foundation	(Timothy	Sandefur,	916.419.7747)
In Support of Respondent Animalfeeds International Corp. 
American	Antitrust	Institute,	et	al.	(Dan	E.	Gustafson,	612.333.8844)
American	Association	for	Justice	and	AARP	(Jeffrey	R.	White,	
202.944.2839)
Dub	Herring	Ford	Lincoln-Mercury,	Inc.	(Richard	D.	Faulkner,	
214.373.7788)
Lawyers’	Committee	for	Civil	Rights	Under	Law,	et	al.	(Sarah	
Crawford,	202.662.8600)
Public	Citizen,	Inc.	(Scott	L.	Nelson,	202.588.1000)
Public	Justice	and	Public	Good	(F.	Paul	Bland	Jr.,	202.797.8600)
In Support of Neither Party 
American	Arbitration	Association	(Eric	P.	Tuchmann,	212.716.3937)
